

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 12651 01 OF 02 182132Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W  
-----044541 182141Z /61

O 182125Z AUG 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3327  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12651

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:YGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM US UK UR  
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UK  
ON CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS

CTB MESSAGE NO. 307

1. SUMMARY: MEMBERS OF THE US AND UK DELS MET ON  
AUGUST 16 AND 17 FOR DISCUSSIONS OF THE CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS  
ISSUE. UK REPRESENTATIVES REPORTED ON THE RECENT CABINET-  
LEVEL DISCUSSIONS OF THIS MATTER IN LONDON, AND OFFERED  
COMMENTS ON THE US POSITION. THE UK HAS NO PREFERRED  
APPROACH. THEY ARE CONSIDERING THREE POSSIBILITIES:  
(A) THE US APPROACH; (B) MAKING NO SPECIAL PROVISIONS  
FOR CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS, AND (C) PROVISION FOR REQUEST-  
ING A PRESENCE DURING EXPLOSIONS ABOVE SOME AGREED LEVEL,  
SUCH AS 2 KILOTONS, AND NO PROVISION FOR PRENOTIFICATION  
OF SMALLER EXPLOSIONS. EDMONDS (UK) ASKED THAT WE DEFER  
OUR PLANNED PLENARY STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT TO PERMIT  
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON DURING THE BREAK.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 12651 01 OF 02 182132Z

IN THE COURSE OF THE AUGUST 17 MEETING, JOHNSON (US)  
AGREED TO SUCH A DEFERRAL. END SUMMARY.

2. US REPS (JOHNSON, NEIDLE, GIVAN, AND SCHRAGE) MET  
WITH UK REPS (EDMONDS, WETHERELL, AND BRINKLEY) ON  
AUGUST 16 TO DISCUSS THE US PROPOSAL ON CHEMICAL EX-  
PLOSIONS, WHICH JOHNSON SAID WE HOPED TO TABLE AT THE

FINAL PLENARY BEFORE THE BREAK. EDMONDS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE UK DELEGATION HAD NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THOSE INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH WERE EXPECTED SHORTLY, WOULD BE TO ASK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF OUR PROPOSAL. EDMONDS DESCRIBED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE UK. JOHNSON REITERATED OUR DESIRE TO TABLE OUR PROPOSAL ON CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS DURING THE PLENARY SESSION IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE BREAK. HE BELIEVED THAT OUR PROPOSAL WAS A REASONABLE ONE WHICH COULD BE NEGOTIATED SATISFACTORILY WITH THE SOVIET DEL. THE US, IN PREPARING THIS PROPOSAL, HAD CONSIDERED MANY VARIANTS, INCLUDING A TWO-TIER PROCEDURE. HE HAD STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE US POSITION REFLECTED IN OUR PROPOSAL AND HAD ARGUED FOR IT. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT TINKERING WITH IT WOULD PRODUCE A BETTER PROPOSAL. HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THE UK WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE US DEL'S TABLING THE PROPOSAL AT THE PLENARY ON AUGUST 18.

3. WITH REGARD TO UK OPTIONS, NEIDLE SAID THAT PRE-NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE COULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO THE VERIFICATION PROCESS. AS FOR ATTEMPTING TO INCLUDE IN THE PROPOSAL A REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF REQUESTING OBSERVATION, THIS WOULD PRODUCE NO SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDEND SINCE IT WOULD BE OPEN TO US TO RAISE SUCH A POSSIBILITY IN ANY CASE THROUGH THE JCC. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 12651 01 OF 02 182132Z

VERY USEFUL TO BE ABLE TO TABLE OUR PROPOSAL BEFORE THE BREAK SO THAT THE SOVIETS COULD TAKE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY IT. EDMONDS SAID THAT HE WOULD REPORT US DEL'S VIEWS BACK TO LONDON. HOWEVER, HE VERY MUCH DOUBTED THAT UK ACQUIESCENCE COULD BE OBTAINED BY THAT DATE. THERE WERE MORE CRITICAL ISSUES ON WHICH DECISIONS MUST BE TAKEN -- DURATION AND RELATED ISSUES -- AND HE DOUBTED WHETHER HE COULD CONVINCE LONDON OF THE NEED TO TAKE RAPID ACTION ON THIS "MUCH LESS IMPORTANT" ISSUE.

4. US REPS (JOHNSON, FINCH, AND PHILLIPS) MET WITH UK REPS (FAKLEY, WEEKS, AND DUNMORE) ON AUGUST 17 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE. FAKLEY, WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE DELIBERATIONS IN LONDON, OFFERED A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE UK'S THINKING ON THE MATTER. HE OBSERVED THAT THE UK SHARED OUR GENERAL ASSESSMENT THAT, IF THE SOVIETS WISHED TO EVADE A TEST BAN, THEY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO DO SO BY MEANS OTHER THAN UNDER THE COVER OF CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS. NEVERTHELESS, SOME OFFICIALS IN LONDON CONSIDERED THAT THE US PROPOSAL HAD CERTAIN DISADVANTAGES WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH US IN WASHINGTON. THEY WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS THE POSSI-

BILITY OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES BEFORE MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THEIR MINISTERS.

5. FAKLEY DESCRIBED THE THREE OPTIONS WHICH WERE BEING CONSIDERED IN LONDON, AND EACH OPTION WAS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY: - OPTION A: THE US PROPOSAL. THE US PROPOSAL WOULD NOT PROVIDE COMPLETE PROTECTION AGAINST CONCEALMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN ALLEGED OR ACTUAL LARGE CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS. SOME SCENARIOS WERE DISCUSSED, AND JOHNSON

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 12651 02 OF 02 182137Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W

-----044620 182144Z /61

O 182125Z AUG 78

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3328

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 12651

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

INDICATED THAT WE HAD TAKEN SUCH CASES FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR DELIBERATIONS. FAKLEY THEN OBSERVED THAT THE MAIN DISADVANTAGE TO THE US PLAN WAS THAT PRE-NOTIFICATION COULD REDUCE THE PROSPECTS OF OBTAINING AN ON-SITE INSPECTION (OSI) FOLLOWING A SUSPICIOUS CHEMICAL EXPLOSION. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE SOVIETS COULD REJECT A REQUEST FOR AN OSI OF A PRE-NOTIFIED CHEMICAL EXPLOSION, ARGUING THAT THEY HAD FULLY DESCRIBED THE EXPLOSION IN ADVANCE. FINCH SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE SITUATION WOULD BE WORSE WITHOUT PRE-NOTIFICATION. THE SOVIETS COULD PROVIDE THE SAME INFORMATION AFTER THE FACT AND USE THE SAME ARGUMENT IN REJECTING AN OSI REQUEST, BUT WE WOULD HAVE LOST THE BENEFITS OF PRE-NOTIFICATION.

- OPTION B: NO SPECIAL VERIFICATION MEASURES IN RELATION TO CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS. THIS OPTION WOULD AVOID THE DISADVANTAGE, AS NOTED ABOVE, WHICH SOME IN THE UK SAW IN

THE US APPROACH. SIGNALS FROM "CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS"  
WOULD BE TREATED IDENTICALLY WITH ALL OTHER "AMBIGUOUS  
EVENTS." THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO MAKE THE "DIFFICULT  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 12651 02 OF 02 182137Z

JUDGMENT" ON WHAT THE PRE-NOTIFICATION LEVEL SHOULD BE.  
THE CHANCES OF OBTAINING AGREEMENT TO AN OSI WOULD BE  
BETTER IN THIS CASE, SINCE GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING THE  
SOVIETS THROUGH THE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE WOULD BE BETTER  
THAN IF A CHEMICAL EXPLOSION HAD BEEN PRENOTIFIED.

- OPTION C: PROVISION FOR OBSERVATION OF VERY LARGE  
CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS (E.G. 2 KT OR MORE). THERE WOULD BE  
NO PRE-NOTIFICATION OF EXPLOSIONS BELOW THE AGREED LEVEL,  
BUT FOR THOSE ABOVE THIS LEVEL WE WOULD SEEK AN UNDER-  
STANDING THAT THE "HOST COUNTRY" WOULD INVITE THE OTHER  
PARTIES TO THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT TO OBSERVE THEIR  
LARGEST CHEMICAL SHOTS. THIS IDEA COULD BE PRESENTED AS  
A NATURAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE AND JUSTIFIABLE  
ON THE GROUNDS THAT KILOTON CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS COULD GIVE  
RISE TO MAJOR CONCERNS ABOUT TREATY COMPLIANCE.

6. JOHNSON REITERATED THAT THE FACTORS CITED HAD BEEN  
GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON IN THE COURSE OF  
ARRIVING AT OUR POSITION, AND HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE  
THAT OUR APPROACH WAS A REASONABLE ONE. THERE WAS NO  
PERFECT SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM BUT HE STRONGLY SUPPORTED  
THE US APPROACH AND HOPED THE UK WOULD AGREE THAT IT WAS  
REASONABLE. FAKLEY SAID THE UK EXPERTS WOULD LIKE TO  
CONSULT WITH US EXPERTS DURING THE BREAK, AND URGED THAT  
THE US DEL WAIT UNTIL AFTER SUCH DISCUSSIONS TO MAKE ITS  
PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIETS. JOHNSON SAID THAT, IN VIEW  
OF THE STRONG UK INTEREST, HE WOULD RELUCTANTLY AGREE TO  
DEFER THE PLANNED AUGUST 18 PLENARY STATEMENT LAYING OUT  
THE US POSITION. JOHNSON

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** EXPLOSIVES, LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, NEGOTIATIONS, CHEMICAL WARFARE WEAPONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 18 aug 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978GENEVA12651  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X3  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780338-1191  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** GENEVA  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780850/aaaabpgh.tel  
**Line Count:** 209  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** ebf6f61-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 30 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1700637  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CTB NEGOTIATIONS: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UK ON CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS CTB MESSAGE NO. 307  
**TAGS:** PARM, US, UK, UR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/ebf6f61-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014